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Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation v. United States:
An Expansion of the Feres Doctrine to Include
Military Contractors, Subcontractors, and Suppliers
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,' the United
States Supreme Court denied a military subcontractor's 2 claim for
indemnity3 against the United States in a personal injury suit brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act by an active-duty serviceman.
The Court held that such third party claims are barred by the rationale
of Feres v. United States,4 which denied military personnel and their
heirs the right to sue the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for injuries sustained incident to military service.
Notwithstanding signs that the Feres doctrine might eventually
be abrogated, 5 the Supreme Court in Stencel unequivocally reaffirmed
Feres and expanded the scope of the doctrine to include third parties
seeking indemnity from the United States on claims by active-duty
service personnel. The purpose of this Note is to examine the Court's
decision in Stencel in terms of judicial precedent and in light of the
important public policy concerns on which the Court relied. The
analysis will also consider the effect of Stencel on indemnity claims
of private parties sued as joint tortfeasors with the government.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)O
in 1946, the doctrine of sovereign immunity7 insulated the United
1. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
2. Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation had no written contract with the gov-
ernment. It had contracted with North American Rockwell, the prime government
contractor, to manufacture the ejection system for the F-100 aircraft being constructed
by Rockwell. Id. at 667-68 n.2. Notwithstanding the fact contractors have no direct
dealings with the government, the Stencel decision precludes their claims for indemnity.
3. Although the Court's consideration in Stencel was directed to a military sub-
contractor's claim for indemnity from the government, the decision should apply to
contribution claims as well. See notes 96-102 & accompanying text infra.
4. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
5. See notes 18-20 & accompanying text infra.
6. The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted as Title IV of the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 101, 60 Stat. 812. The Act is now
found in Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b),
2412, 2671-80 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
7. See W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs 970-87 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
[ 1217]
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States from liability in tort for the negligent acts or omissions of its
employees or servants. Precluded by this doctrine from seeking judi-
cial redress, parties injured by the negligence of government servants
had to resort to the arduous process of private bills in Congress" as the
sole remedy for their losses. This procedure, however, proved un-
satisfactory. As the volume of these private bills increased, Congress
became progressively less able to adjudicate adequately each claim,
and as a result, relief was sporadic and often insufficient.
With the adoption of the FTCA, Congress waived the govern-
ment's immunity from tort liability and granted the federal district
courts jurisdiction over any subsequent tort claims against the gov-
ernment.9 With a few limited exceptions, 10 the FTCA subjects the
United States to liability for the negligent acts or omissions of any
government employee "while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.""
Four years after the adoption of the FTCA, the United States
Supreme Court in Feres v. United States 2 created a judicial exception
to the Act's general waiver of immunity. In Feres, the Supreme Court
held that active-duty service personnel and their heirs could not re-
cover from the government under the FTCA for injuries or death
sustained "incident to service."'13  The courts have generally inter-
preted the phrase "incident to service" quite broadly and have held that
all injuries suffered by active-duty service personnel, whether or not
these injuries result from the performance of a service-related task,
are incident to service. This interpretation includes, for example,
PROSSER]; Jaffe, Suits against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HAv.
L. REv. 1 (1963).
8. See L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §§ 51-52 (1977).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
10. Those claims expressly excluded by statute from coverage under the FTCA
are found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. V 1975). These include claims based on acts
of government employees "in the execution of a statute or regulation;" claims based
on an employee's performance or failure to perform a "discretionary function or duty;"
claims based on "negligent transmission of letters or postal matter;" claims arising
"in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty;" claims based
on ennumerated intentional torts of government employees; claims arising out of "com-
batant activities of the military;" claims arising in a foreign country.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
12. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
13. Id. at 146. For discussion of Feres and the development of the Feres doc-
trine, see Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Jacoby]. See also Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine after Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.
JAG L. REv. 24 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rhodes].
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injuries sustained by an active-duty serviceman as a result of a negli-
gently performed vasectomy operation,'14 the drowning of an active-
duty airman while swimming for recreation in the base pool,15 and
injuries suffered by a serviceman while undergoing a hernia operation
in a military hospital.16 Although the injuries in each of these cases
did not arise while the serviceman was performing a military-related
task, the courts have held that the injuries were nonetheless incident
to service. The injured servicemen were thus precluded by Feres
from suing the government under the FTCA.'7
Since Feres, this judicially created rule precluding active-duty
service personnel from suing the government under the FTCA for
injuries sustained incident to service has been subjected to severe
criticism,' and on several occasions the Supreme Court itself narrowed
the scope of the doctrine. In United States v. Brown,' the Court
ruled that the Feres doctrine did not bar an FTCA suit for injuries
sustained in a military hospital by a discharged veteran. In United
States v. Muniz,20 the Court refused to extend the doctrine to claims
by federal prisoners against the government. What some viewed as
growing judicial disfavor with the Feres doctrine 21 has been dispelled,
however, by Stencel.
The Stencel Decision
Stencel involved a personal injury claim brought under the FTCA
by a national guard officer against, inter alia, the United States and
Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation. The officer had been injured
during an activity incident to service when the ejection system of
his fighter aircraft malfunctioned' during a mid-air emergency. The
14. Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1974).
15. Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966).
16. Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).
17. A contrary view followed only in the Sixth Circuit is that the phrase "incident
to service" involves only those injuries that are the product of military discipline or duty.
Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969). Under both the majority and
minority views service personnel injured while on furlough and not on active-duty status
are not precluded by Feres from suing the government for their injuries. Brooks v.
United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949); see notes 71-73 & accompanying text infra. The
Stencel decision has no effect on these cases.
18. E.g., Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RuraERs
L. REv. 316 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Hitch]; see authorities cited at notes 38 & 86
infra.
19. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
20. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
21. See note 86 infra.
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faulty ejection system had been manufactured in accordance with
government specifications by Stencel, a subcontractor to the prime
government contractor, North American Rockwell. The government
had provided Stencel with several of the components used in the sys-
tem. The officer alleged that the ejection system malfunctioned as
a result of the "negligence and carelessness of the defendants individ-
ually and jointly."22
Stencel alleged that, if it had been negligent, its negligence was
passive while the government's was active. On this theory, under
Missouri law,23 Stencel cross-claimed against the United States, seek-
ing indemnity for any adverse judgment. The government moved for
summary judgment on the negligence claim and for dismissal of
Stencel's cross-claim, asserting that Feres barred the serviceman's claim
as well as any claim for indemnity or contribution by a joint tort-
feasor when the injured party was an active-duty serviceperson. The
district court granted both motions.2 4  The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Stencel's cross-claim,25 and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 26 to consider the
indemnity question.
In evaluating Stencel's claim that its suit for indemnity against
the United States under the FTCA should be permitted, a majority
of the Court relied almost exclusively upon language in Feres v. United
States. The Court found that of the several factors it had considered
in reaching its decision in Feres, three were especially relevant to
Stencel's claim for indemnity. First, the relationship between the
government and its soldiers is "distinctively federal in character 2
7
and therefore must be governed exclusively by federal law.28  Second,
the Veterans' Benefits Act provides "an upper limit of liability for the
22. 431 U.S. at 668.
23. See note 11 & accompanying text supra. Plaintiff Donham was injured in
Missouri.
24. Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
25. 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the circuit court's opinion,
see Note, Federal Tort Claims Act - Defendants' Claims for Indemnity against the
United States, 25 U. KAN. L. REv. 601 (1977). Plaintiff Donham did not appeal the
dismissal of his claim against the United States.
26. 429 U.S. 958 (1976).
27. 431 U.S. at 671. The phrase "distinctively federal in character" was first
adopted by the Supreme Court to describe the relationship between military and soldier
in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1947). For a discussion
of the Standard Oil decision, see notes 54-55 & accompanying text infra. In Feres, the
Court, by reference to Standard Oil, once again used the phrase to describe the military-
soldier relationship. 340 U.S. at 143.
28. 431 U.S. at 673.
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Government as to service-connected injuries."29  Third, the mainten-
ance of such suits would have an adverse effect on military discipline. 30
The Court's conclusion that these three factors applied with equal
validity to the Stencel facts ignores substantial differences between
suits brought directly by service personnel and those brought by third
parties seeking indemnity.
A Relationship Distinctively Federal in Character
Feres v. United States involved three cases consolidated on cer-
tiorari, each involving an active duty serviceman who was injured or
killed incident to service.31 The injured serviceman or his heirs in
each instance sought recovery from the United States under the FTCA,
claiming that the death or injuries were the result of the negligence
of agents or employees of the United States. Notwithstanding the
"sweeping language" of the Act in waiving immunity and its seemingly
exclusive list of those unable to bring suit under the Act, which did
not include active-duty service personnel,32 the Supreme Court denied
the servicemen's claims against the government. The Feres Court
determined that without express statutory language the FTCA could
not be read as creating this new cause of action against the govern-
ment. The Court relied upon several factors in reaching this inter-
pretation of the statute. Foremost was the Court's recognition of a
unique relationship between the government and members of the
armed forces, 3 a relationship which the Court defined as "distinctively
federal in character."3 4  The Court then concluded that Congress
never intended to include this distinctively federal relationship within
the purview of the FTCA,35 which expressly conditions the federal
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 340 U.S. at 138.
32. See notes 39-40 & accompanying text infra.
33. The Court considered other factors. Congress had enacted the Veterans'
Benefits Act which provides for a system of uniform compensation "for injuries or death
of those in armed forces." 340 U.S. at 145. For a discussion of this factor, see
notes 59-78 & accompanying text infra. Service personnel, in the performance of their
military duties, are stationed throughout the nation; and because the FTCA provides
recovery according to local law, Congress could not have intended to provide for "those
disabled in service" by making their recovery dependent upon "geographic considera-
tions over which they have no control and . . . laws which fluctuate in existence and
value." 340 U.S. at 143.
34. 340 U.S. at 143-44. In support of this "special relationship" theory, the
Court cited cases which held that the affiliation between the government and its armed
forces is governed exclusively by federal rather than state law. See notes 49-55 & ac-
companying text infra.
35. 340 U.S. at 146.
government's tort liability on federal law which adopts as its basis
state law. 36  The Court maintained that a contrary conclusion would
have implied that Congress intended to subject the United States to
disparate and inconsistent recoveries for the same type of injury to
its service personnel, depending upon the laws of the particular state
in which the serviceperson was injured. 37
The Feres Court's interpretation, which excluded military-govern-
ment relationships from the scope of the FTCA, has been criticized by
several scholars,38 who maintain that the stated purpose of the FTCA
is to subject the federal government to tort liability in accordance with
state law. One commentator proposes39 that, because Congress did
not expressly exclude soldiers who sustained injuries in peacetime
from coverage under the Act, 40 the more likely interpretation is that
Congress in fact intended that military personnel be included under
the provisions of the FTCA. As later scholars observed, however,
congressional silence and inaction in this matter for the last twenty-
five years strongly suggest Congress's acquiescence in, or ratification
of, the Feres decision.
41
In Stencel, the United States Supreme Court again invoked the
"distinctively federal relationship" concept. 42  The context, however,
was significantly different. In Stencel, the Court was dealing not
with a matter between the government and its military personnel, as
in Feres, but rather with a situation involving the government and a
supplier of ordnance. The Court dismissed this difference with its
statement that "the relationship between the Government and its
suppliers of ordnance is certainly no less 'distinctively federal in char-
acter' than the relationship between the Government and its soldiers.."43
The only factor cited by the Court to support its finding of a unique
federal relationship between the government and military suppliers
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
37. 340 U.S. at 143. The Feres Court recognized, of course, that Congress could
at any time subject this "distinctively federal" relationship to local law. Id. at 138.
38. Hitch, supra note 18; Note, Military Rights under the FTCA, 43 ST. JoHN'N
L. REV. 455 (1969); Note, Federal Liability to Personnel of the Armed Forces, 20 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 90 (1951). Even these authorities generally recognize that the "dis-
tinctively federal" relationship between government and soldier has been governed
historically by federal law. Hitch, supra note 18, at 336; 43 ST. JOHN's L. REV., supra
at 467. Disagreement with the Feres court arises primarily over the effect of the FTCA
upon this relationship.
39. Hitch, supra note 18 at 334.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. V 1975).
41. E.g., Jacoby, supra note 13, at 1301. See also Rhodes, supra note 13.
42. 431 U.S. at 671.
43. 431 U.S. at 672.
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was the presence of military operations and installations on a nation-
wide basis. 44 A supplier's or contractor's goods, like soldiers, the
Court reasoned, are dispersed nationally, and it "makes . . . little
sense to permit [the] situs [of the alleged negligence] to affect the
Government's liability to a Government contractor . . .
Using this analysis to support its "distinctively federal" character-
ization of the government-supplier association, the Court reaches two
questionable conclusions: first, that this affiliation between govern-
ment and supplier must be governed exclusively by federal law; and
second, that the supplier must logically be precluded by the reasoning
in Feres from seeking indemnity or contribution from the government
when the injured party is an active-duty serviceperson.
The distinctively-federal-relationship theory, although valid when
applied to the military, has no clear application to military suppliers.
The mere fact that military facilities and equipment, like service per-
sonnel, are located nationwide, thereby subjecting the United States
to the danger of inconsistent state laws "which fluctuate in existence
and value"46 appears insufficient to create a uniquely federal matter.
Indeed, by specifying that state law would apply, Congress in enact-
ing the FTCA adopted a scheme that conditioned the federal govern-
ment's liability in tort upon the various and inconsistent state laws.
Many federal agencies, such as the Social Security Administration,
the Bureau of the Census, and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, have equipment and employees dispersed throughout the
nation. Congress nonetheless adopted the various state laws as the
controlling federal law in determining government liability to persons
injured due to the negligence of employees of these agencies.
More importantly, in discerning a distinctively federal relation-
ship between government and soldier, the Feres Court relied on more
than the mere fact that members of the armed forces were stationed
in the various states. The Court recognized that this uniquely federal
status developed from the need to promote "good order, high morale,
and discipline" within the ranks of the national military forces, so
that the individual soldier will "instantly obey a lawful order, no
matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task may be."47 Accordingly,
a uniform system of rules and regulations completely divorced from
the general state laws governing the civilian population has developed,
44. Id.
45. Id. The FTCA adopts the tort law of the situs to determine recovery. See
note 10 & accompanying text supra.
46. 340 U.S. at 143.
47. E. BmnN, MimrrAnY LAw 1 (2d ed. 1976).
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which closely defines and controls the duties and responsibilities of
military personnel.4 8  One early commentator wrote:
If a national army be established, it is indispensably requisite
that order and discipline should be maintained in that army. To
effect this, it is necessary that the duties of the military be defined
and their performance enforced .. . . According to the con-
stitution, Congress has absolute power over the army. It can
create, organize, increase or disband it at its mere will and pleas-
ure. It has the exclusive power of making Rules and Articles of
war, and of legislating for the public force. *"
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
federal government's exclusive control over the military and has re-
fused to permit local civilian authorities to exercise any jurisdiction
over this uniquely federal matter. Three Supreme Court cases cited
in Feres5° are illustrative.
The earliest of these decisions, Tarbie's Case,--1 involved a minor
who enlisted in the United States Army without his father's consent.
The father alleged that Tarble was "illegally imprisoned"5 2 by the
army and obtained a writ of habeas corpus from a state court to free
his son from the custody of the army. The Supreme Court reversed
and declared that the state court was without authority to act in this
federal matter. In Kurtz v. Moffitt,5' 3 the second case cited in Feres,
an army deserter was arrested by the local police for the purpose of
returning him to military authorities. Kurtz asserted that the civilian
police had no authority to arrest him for a military crime. In up-
holding Kurtz's claim, the Court considered the unique relationship
between the soldier and his superior officers and concluded that such
a relationship was governed solely by federal military law. The third
case cited by the Court, United States v. Standard Oil Co.,54 involved
a suit brought by the United States against Standard Oil to recover
expenses incurred by the government for the hospitalization of a
soldier injured by the negligence of an employee of Standard Oil.
48. The armed forces of the United States are presently governed by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970). Congress's power to regulate
the military is derived from U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power
... [tlo raise and support Armies . . . [t]o provide and maintain a Navy
[and tlo make rules for the Government of the land and naval Forces."
49. J. O'BwIEN, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN MILITARY LAws 25 (1846). See also,
E. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW 1-10 (2d ed. 1976); G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1-12 (3d ed. 1915).
50. 340 U.S. at 143-44.
51. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
52. 80 U.S. at 399.
53. 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
54. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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The Court considered whether the respective duties and liabilities
of each party were governed by federal or state law. In concluding
that federal law must apply, the Court stated:
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen
is more distinctively federal in character than that between it and
members of its armed forces. To whatever extent state law may
apply to govern the relations between soldiers or others in the
armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmen-
tal agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences
of the relation between persons in service and the Government
are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by
federal authority. 55
In all three cases the Supreme Court recognized that military per-
sonnel are governed by a separate body of federal laws best meeting
the needs of the nation as a whole.
The relationship between the government and a supplier, how-
ever, is not analogous to the relationship between the military and a
soldier. The latter relationship is uniquely federal in nature; an affil-
iation between the government and supplier is normally governed
by general contract considerations derived from local state law. One
noted writer in the field has observed: "Except for statutory, regu-
latory and public policy requirements, government contracts contain
reciprocal rights and duties between the government and the con-
tractor and are interpreted in the same manner as private contracts
to which the government is not a party."56 Although there are differ-
ences between government contracts and ordinary private contracts,
5 7
courts have nonetheless consistently interpreted government contracts
in light of general common law contract principles"8 and have not
developed a unique federal statutory or common law analogous to
the military law system to regulate these contracts.
Even if, as assumed by the Court in Stencel, the affiliation between
the military and the supplier is distinctively federal in character, the
55. Id. at 305-06.
56. J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERNMIENT CONTRACTS AM SUBCONTRACTS 54
(1974). For statutory requirements in military procurement, see generally 10 U.S.C.
§§ 2301, 2304-06, 2313, 2352, 2353-58, 2381-89 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
57. These differences include the extent of bargaining over terms and conditions
of the contract, the authority of an agent to bind the government, the necessity of an
appropriation, the government's right to audit the contractor's records, and the govern-
ment's right to recover excessive profits. A thorough examination of these factors is
found in J. PAUL, UNrED STATES GOVmNMENT CONTRACTS AND SuBcoNTRACTS 69-75
(1974).
58. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); cf. Cooke v. United States,
91 U.S. 389 (1875) (general principles of commercial paper applied to U.S. Treasury
notes).
1225
Court treats this uniquely federal relationship quite differently from
the soldier-military relationship. Whereas active-duty service per-
sonnel are precluded summarily by Feres from suing the government
under the FTCA, the military supplier is not similarly barred by Stencel
from seeking indemnity from the government; it is precluded from
seeking indemnity only when the injured party is an active-duty
serviceperson. If the injured party is a civilian or a serviceperson
on furlough, Stencel does not bar the supplier from seeking indemnity
from the government. This distinction may indicate that the Court's
real concern in Stencel was to insure that Feres-disqualified plaintiffs
did not circumvent the Feres decision by bringing suits indirectly
against the government through third party indemnity claims.
The Veterans' Benefits Act as an Upper Limit of Liability
In Stencel, the Supreme Court stated that the Veterans' Benefits
Act (VBA)59 was intended as an "upper limit of liability for the Gov-
ernment as to service-connected injuries,"' o requiring that Stencel's
claim for indemnity be denied. The Court indicated that it was com-
pelled to reach this conclusion on the basis of the Feres decision. In
Feres, however, the Court's inquiry was limited to a consideration of
claims by service personnel against the government. Feres examined
the policy considerations underlying both the VBA and the FTCA
and concluded only that military personnel injured while on active-
duty status were limited in their recovery against the government to
those benefits awarded under the VBA. The effect of the VBA upon
private third party claims was not at issue.
Much of the language employed by the Court concerning the
VBA's upper limit of liability is similar to that used elsewhere to
describe worker's compensation schemes. For example, the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides an upper
limit of liability for the employer.1 The employer's liability is limited
to those benefits awarded under the compensation scheme, and direct
claims by the employee and indemnity claims by third parties are
expressly foreclosed. These worker's compensation schemes, how-
ever, differ from the VBA in two important respects. First, whereas
worker's compensation benefits are awarded only when the employee's
injuries arise in the course of employment, VBA benefits are awarded
whether or not the injuries are service-connected. Thus, service per-
59. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
60. 431 U.S. at 673.
61. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904-09 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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sonnel injured while on furlough or while undergoing elective surgery
in a military hospital may recover benefits under the VBA after sepa-
ration from military service.62  Second, under tradtitional workers'
compensation acts, employees who receive benefits thereunder are
barred from seeking further relief from their employers. In contrast,
many service personnel who have received VBA benefits can seek
further relief from the government. 3
In Stencel, the Court described the VBA as a "statutory 'no fault'
compensation scheme which provides generous pensions to injured
servicemen without regard to any negligence attributable to the gov-
ernment."6 4  The Act was indeed intended to provide compensation
for service personnel injured or killed in the line of duty; 3 it does
not require the serviceperson to prove fault in order to recover.
The VBA does preclude members of the armed forces from receiving
benefits if their disability is the result of willful misconduct, or if
they are dishonorably discharged."6
The Stencel Court further maintained that the VBA was intended
as a "substitute for tort liability"6 7 in that it "clothes the Government
in the 'protective mantle of [its] limitation of liability provisions."' 6 s
The Court's contentions here were twofold: first, that the VBA was
intended as the exclusive remedy 9 against the government for service
62. See Hitch, supra note 18, at 331.
63. See notes 71-73 & accompanying text infra. For a general discussion of work-
ers' compensation schemes, see A. LAaSON, THE LA-w OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(1978).
64. 431 U.S. at 671.
65. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 321, 331, 341 (1970).
66. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 331 (1970). Hitch, slapra note 18, at 331, writes, for ex-
ample: "The Veterans' Administration views are that there is no distinction in the laws
applicable to veterans' benefits between 'service-connected' disability or death and dis-
ability or death 'caused by' service, nor is there any distinction between such matters
on the ground of 'line of duty.' The Administrator of Veterans' Affairs pointed out
that the only possible case of injury or death of a member of the armed forces, whether
on furlough or at a post of duty, which would not be subject to the benefit of veterans-
laws would be if the same had occurred by reason of the serviceman's own miscon-
duct .. " See also Note, Federal Liability to Personnel of the Armed Forces, 20 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 90, 105 (1951). The Court's contention that the benefits provided
under the VBA are "generous" is open to question. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 322, 334,
342 (Supp. V 1975) (setting payment rates).
67. 431 U.S. at 671.
68. Id. at 673.
69. The VBA is not the "exclusive" remedy against the government for service-
connected injuries. A serviceperson who has suffered at least a 30% disability may
seek retirement pay in accordance with 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201-21 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)
rather than VBA benefits. The amount of retirement pay will often prove more gener-
ous than VBA benefits. See 10 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
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personnel injured while on active-duty status, and second, that this
exclusive remedy also barred third party indemnity claims against the
government when the injured party was an active-duty military per-
son. Neither of these conclusions, however, is supported by the
language of the VBA. The Court's determination, rather, reflects a
strong endorsement of its earlier interpretation in Feres of legislative
intent, notwithstanding the harsh impact on the potential indemnitee.
The language of the VBA does not expressly provide for an upper
limit of liability for the government for service personnel injured while
on active-duty status or on furlough. The Act does not expressly
provide that military persons are limited in their recovery against the
government to those benefits received under its provisions. ° Indeed,
the right of service personnel to seek further relief from the govern-
ment under the FTCA in addition to benefits received under the VBA
has been expressly recognized in other circumstances. In Brooks v.
United States,71 the Supreme Court declared that the VBA was not
intended as the upper limit on the government's liability for injuries
sustained by military personnel while on furlough
-72
Provisions in other statutes for disability payments to service-
men, and gratutity payments to their survivors . . . indicate no
purpose to forbid tort actions under the Tort Claims Act ....
[T]here is nothing in the Tort Claims Act or the veterans' laws
which provides for exclusiveness of remedy . . . . Nor did
Congress provide for an election of remedies . . . . We will
not call either remedy in the present case exclusive, nor pro-
nounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not
done so."
In Stencel, on the other hand, the Court declared that "one of
the essential features" of the VBA is its limitation of liability pro-
visions.74 This "essential feature" of the VBA, however, is limited
by the Court to those situations when the serviceman or woman is
injured while on active-duty status.75 Thus, in the Brooks situation,
70. The VBA provides (1) who is eligible to receive benefits, 38 U.S.C. §§ 310,
410 (1970); (2) when a person is eligible, 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1970); and (3) the
monthly rate to be paid, 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 322, 334, 342 (Supp. V 1975). Nowhere
within the Act itself does it provide that these benefits serve as an upper limit on the
government's liability for service-related injuries. Compare Federal Employees Com-
pensation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1970); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. V 1975).
71. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
72. Under present law, the term now used is leave. 10 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. V
1975).
73. Id. at 53. The Stencel decision should have no effect on this kind of situation.
74. 431 U.S. at 673.
75. Id. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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service personnel who receive compensation under the VBA may
nonetheless sue both the government and the military supplier for
further damages. In these cases, moreover, the suppliers would not
be precluded by Stencel from seeking indemnity from the government.
The actual source of the asserted VBA limitation of liability provision
must be found in the Court's Feres decision denying active-duty
service personnel the right to sue the government under the FTCA
and not within the language of the Act.
The second arm of the Court's position, that the VBA's limitation
of liability provision bars third party indemnity claims against the
government where the injured party is an active-duty military per-
son,7 6 is based largely on the conceptualization that if such indemnity
claims were permitted, service personnel precluded by Feres from
seeking damages directly from the United States would recover dam-
ages from the government indirectly through these third party claims. 77
The Court stated, for example: "'To permit [petitioner] to proceed
. . * here would be to judicially admit at the back door that which
has been legislatively turned away at the front door."78 This state-
ment is not precisely correct since it was the Feres Court and not
Congress which precluded service personnel from suing the govern-
ment directly under the FTCA for injuries incident to service. In
order to prevent this circumvention of the Feres doctrine, the Court
summarily barred Stencel's claim.
76. 431 U.S. at 673.
77. Several Federal Employee Compensation Act (FECA) cases have presented
facts similar to Stencel: plaintiffs were precluded by the FECA's exclusive remedy
provision, 5 U.S.C. § 757(b), from suing the government directly under the FTCA,
and third parties were seeking indemnity from the government on claims by these ex-
eluded plaintiffs. The courts have split as to whether the third party claims may be
maintained against the government. See Wallenius Bremen G. m. b. H. v. United States,
409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (third party claims
not precluded by the exclusive remedy provisions of FECA); Newport Air Park, Inc. v.
United States, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1951 (1964) (FECA's exclusive remedy
provision barred third party claims); see also Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 597 (1963). Stencel implications could preclude third parties from receiving
indemnity from the government on claims by FECA-disqualified plaintiffs in the future.
78. 431 U.S. at 673 (quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972)). In
denying the claim, the Court acknowledged Stencel's plea that a denial of its claim
would leave it without a remedy, 431 U.S. at 672. Under traditional worker's compen-
sation statutes a similar result may often be avoided by an express contract of indemnity
between the employer and the third party; the third party is indemnified by the em-
ployer for any damage awards paid to the employee. The military supplier is barred
by statute from negotiating for an indemnity clause in its government contract. See
note 106 & accompanying text infra. A denial of its claim for indemnity does indeed
leave it without a remedy.
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Effect of a Third Party Indemnity Action on
Military Discipline
The third factor considered by the Supreme Court in denying
Stencel's claim for indemnity was the "effect of the action on military
discipline.-, 9 Although the Feres Court had not explicitly discussed
military discipline, it was addressed implicitly when the Court stated,
"We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier
to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the
Government he is serving.'sO The Feres Court, by denying the serv-
icemen's claims, foreclosed judicial action that might have had an
adverse effect on military discipline.
In Stencel, however, the denial of the military supplier's indem-
nity claims against the government does not guarantee that military
discipline will remain insulated from the adverse effects of tort litiga-
tion. Indeed, many of the issues that would have been litigated in
the indemnity action if Stencel Corporation had prevailed on its cross-
claim may nonetheless be litigated in the plaintiff's action against the
private third party."'
The military discipline factor was first considered by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Brown. 2 In Brown, a discharged veteran
sued the government under the FTCA for the negligent treatment of
his knee in a Veterans Administration hospital. Because Brown had
first injured his knee while on active duty in the armed forces, the
government contended that Feres barred the serviceman's claim. The
Court ruled, however, that, because Brown was no longer on active-
duty status, he was not precluded by Feres from suing the govern-
ment under the FTCA. In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized
that the military discipline argument was indeed one of the factors
considered determinative by the Feres Court in its decision to limit
the right of service personnel on active duty to sue the government
for service related injuries:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his su-
periors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline,
and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent
acts committed in the course of military duty, led the [Feres]
Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that character .
3
79. 431 U.S. at 673.
80. 340 U.S. at 141.
81. See notes 94-95 & accompanying text infra.
82. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
83. Id. at 112.
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The military discipline argument was once again examined by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Muniz.8 4  In Muniz, two
prisoners sued the United States under the FTCA to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained while confined in a federal prison.
Claiming that the relationship between prisoners and the federal
government was sufficiently analogous to the government-soldier re-
lationship, the United States argued that Feres barred the prisoners'
claims. In rejecting the government's argument the Court recon-
sidered several of the factors examined in Feres and concluded that
the military discipline argument was persuasive: "In the last analy-
sis, Feres seems best explained by the . . . 'effects of the maintenance
of such suits on discipline."-85 Commentators generally agree, more-
over, that the military discipline factor remains a viable support for
the Feres doctrine.8
6
In Stencel, the Supreme Court again warned that if service per-
sonnel were permitted to sue the government under the FTCA for
service-related injuries, the result would be a breakdown in military
discipline.8 7  The Court further stated that this military discipline
rationale applies with equal validity to an indemnity action brought
by a third party against the government when the injured party is
in the armed forces: "[I]t seems quite clear that where the case
concerns an injury sustained by a soldier while on duty, the effect of
the action upon military discipline is identical whether the suit is
brought by the soldier directly or by a third party."8  This assump-
tion presents two important questions: first, whether the assumption
is itself correct and second, if it is correct, whether the Court's denial
of the indemnity claim effectively protects military discipline from
judicial disruption.
In determining that the effect on military discipline would be
identical whether the suit was brought by service personnel or by
third parties, the Court found that in both instances it would be
84. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
85. Id. at 162.
86. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 13, at 42; Note, Servicemenr s Tort Claims against
the United States - United States v. Lee, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 1059, 1062-64 (1970). One
noted commentator, Professor Sidney Jacoby, writes, "The Feres exception [to the
FTCA] is clearly a 'judge-made rule, and the only rationale of that doctrine still main-
tainable in light of the gradual development of that doctrine is the 'general military
discipline" concept." Jacoby, supra note 13, at 1291. For an examination of whether
in spite of this military discipline factor Congress intended to grant service personnel
the right to sue the government under the FTCA, see notes 38-41 & accompanying text
supra.
87. 431 U.S. at 673.
88. Id.
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necessary to litigate" the degree of fault . . . on the part of the
Government's agents."s9 A breakdown in military discipline would
be caused by "second guessing military orders" and requiring "mem-
bers of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each other's
decisions and actions." 90
Under the FTCA, if service personnel were permitted to sue the
government directly for injuries sustained incident to service, they
would be required to establish that their injuries were the result of
the "negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee of the
government while "acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment"'' and not in the exercise of a discretionary function or duty.92
In order to prove the government employee's fault, plaintiffs would
undoubtedly engage in "second-guessing" military orders by asking
such questions as whether the action in question could have been
performed by a safer method or whether the officer in charge was
aware of the risks involved. In many cases, they would call other
members of the armed forces to testify about the incident in question.
The Court's concern that the same elements would be litigated
when the suit was brought by the third party potential indemnitee,
with the resulting disruption of military discipline, may be well
founded. The supplier would need to prove the government's negli-
gence in order to recover on its claim for indemnity. This often would
entail calling into question military orders and subpoenaing military
personnel to testify on its behalf. The attempt to prove government
fault Would occur whether the supplier's claim for indemnity was
based on an express or implied contract provision that the government
perform its obligations in a reasonable and workmanlike manner or,
as in the case of Stencel, on the assertion that "its negligence was
passive, while the negligence of the United States was active."93
89. Id.
90. Id. The Court's fears concerning the "second guessing" of military orders may
be somewhat exaggerated in light of the "discretionary function" exception to the
FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). See note 10 supra.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
93. 431 U.S. at 668. A right to indemnity may arise under four general circum-
stances: (1) by an express agreement between the parties providing for indemnity
(express contract); (2) by implication, as when a court reads into a contract a pro-
vision that the work will be performed in a skillful and careful manner (implied con-
tract); (3) by reason of the relationship between the parties, such as that of bailor-
bailee, employer-employee; (4) by operation of law, where the negligence of one party
was primary or active while the negligence of the other was secondary or passive. For
a general analysis of these four forms of indemnity, see L. FRUMER, M. FRIEDMAN,
L. PILGRIM, R. OLIVER & I. THAU, 4C PERSONAL INJURY, ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES
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Although the effect on military discipline would probably be
identical "whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or by
a third party,"94 the Court's decision in Stencel to deny indemnity
claims fails to accomplish its stated purpose. The Court's decision
simply insures the government's immunity from suit. It does not
preclude service personnel from independently suing private party
defendants in state court9" for their injuries; they are free to pursue
this course of action even if they have been fully compensated for
their injuries under the VBA. In this independent action, the ques-
tion of the government's negligence may be litigated, resulting in
the same undesirable disruption of military discipline. As a defense
to the serviceperson's claim, for example, the military supplier could
assert that the government's negligence was the sole cause of the
resulting injuries, or that the injuries were the result of the service-
person's own actions in carrying out a military order. Once again,
in proving these assertions, the supplier might well need to subpoena
military personnel and to second guess military orders. Consequently,
the Court's denial of Stencel's indemnity claim does not effectively
protect military discipline from judicial scrutiny and disruption. The
military discipline rationale, seemingly the most compelling of the
factors relied upon by the Court to deny Stencel's indemnity claim,
does not justify the Court's position because it fails to achieve its
essential purpose.
Application of the Stencel Ruling
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Stencel is direct
and unequivocal: government contractors and suppliers of military
ordnance are barred from seeking indemnity or contribution"0 from
the government under the FTCA for amounts paid to service personnel
injured while on active-duty status. The result is that these suppliers
§ 1.01 (1971). See also PRossER, supra note 7, at 312. The Court's decision in
Stencel to preclude indemnity claims, however, would appear to apply to all four forms
of indemnity.
94. 431 U.S. at 673.
95. The secondary result of the Feres and Stencel decisions limiting the right to
sue under the FTCA is to divest the federal district courts of subject matter jurisdic-
tion over claims by service personnel against the supplier. Except in cases of diversity
of citizenship, these claims will be prosecuted in state court.
96. Stencel does not speak directly to contribution, but the same rationale should
apply. Indemnity entails shifting "the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has been
compelled to pay it to the shoulders of another who should bear it instead." Con-
tribution, on the other hand, "distributes the loss among the tortfeasors by requiring
each to pay his proportionate share." PaossER, supra note 7, at 310.
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and contractors may be required, under the doctrine of joint and
several liability, to bear not only the cost of their own negligence but
also that of the government.
9 7
Under common law doctrine, each joint tortfeasor is liable for
the full amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff. Such was the
rule "even though his act concurred or combined with that of another
wrongdoer to produce the result."98  Beginning with the early English
case of Merryweather v. Nixan,99 these same common law courts de-
veloped the notion that willful or intentional wrongdoers were pre-
cluded from seeking contribution for their losses from the remaining
joint tortfeasors. In the United States, the courts expanded this rule
forbidding contribution to include negligent wrongdoers as well. 100
Recognizing the harshness of such a rule, several American jurisdic-
tions began to permit, either by judicial decision or by legislative ac-
tion, contribution among negligent joint tortfeasors. Presently thirty-
eight American jurisdictions allow some degree of contribution. 10 1
Even in those jurisdictions that expressly forbid contribution the
common law right to indemnity is often recognized.
102
In United States v. Yellow Cab. Co.,'0 3 the United States Supreme
Court held that the various state laws concerning indemnity and
97. Whether the Court's decision in Stencel will be limited to suppliers of military
ordnance is not presently clear. Throughout the decision, however, the Court focuses
upon Stencel's role as an ordnance supplier as one basis for extending the Feres doctrine
to bar its claim. 431 U.S. at 672. The opinion, however, leaves sufficient leeway for
a broader application of the decision and may be construed to bar indemnity claims
by all military suppliers including those which provide such non-ordnance supplies as
food, clothing, furniture, and housing. This latter conclusion seems persuasive in light
of the Court's apparent underlying concern in Stencel to prevent Feres-disqualified
plaintiffs from seeking recovery from the government indirectly through third party
claims. In order to prevent such a circumvention of Feres, the Court may decide to
include all military suppliers and contractors within the rationale of the Stencel decision.
98. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 297.
99. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
100. See PaOSSER, supra note 7, at 305-08.
101. The jurisdictions are collected in Michael & Appel, Contribution and Indem-
nity among Joint Tortleasors in Illinois: A Need for Reform, 7 Loy. Cmi. L.J. 591,
617 n.110 (1976). The mere existence of a contribution statute does not mean that
one tortfeasor can automatically seek contribution from a fellow tortfeasor. These stat-
utes often expressly limit the right of contribution to certain tortfeasors (nonintentional
tortfeasors) and then only if certain conditions precedent are satisfied (a joint judgment
has been rendered against both tortfeasors and one of them has paid more than his
pro rata share). See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875 (West 1976); N.Y. Civ. Paac. LAW
§ 1401 (McKinney 1976).
102. See generally PRossER, supra note 7, at 310-13.
103. 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
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contribution were applicable against the United States under the
FTCA:
The question presented is whether the Federal Tort Claims Act
empowers a United States District Court to require the United
States to be impleaded as a third-party defendant and to answer
the claim of a joint tort-feasor for contribution as if the United
States were a private individual . . . [W]e hold that it does. 04
Following the Yellow Cab decision, all private party defendants
held jointly liable with the government were able to mitigate their
losses by seeking contribution or indemnity'0 5 from the government.
Stencel, however, forecloses such actions to contractors and suppliers
of military ordnance where the injured party was an active-duty
serviceperson. Stencel effectively declares that, regardless of state
law, the right to indemnity does not exist for Stencet-type defendants.
Consequently, these same defendants, although jointly negligent with
the government, must bear the entire burden of the loss.
With the denial of Stencel's claim for indemnity, the remedies
available to military suppliers and contractors like Stencel take one
of two forms. First, because government contractors are precluded
by statute from negotiating with the government for indemnity clauses
in their contracts,10 the only way these contractors can attempt to
limit their losses from a Stencel situation is by means of liability in-
surance.10 7  Strictly speaking, liability insurance coverage is not, how-
ever, a "remedy." Because the insured, in order to meet the costs of
such insurance, would undoubtedly increase the amount of its bid
for the government contract, the government would pay indirectly
for such insurance coverage through increased contract prices. Ab-
sorbing the cost of this liability insurance coverage may simply prove
too costly to small suppliers such as Stencel who have no direct deal-
ings with the government.
Second, military contractors denied indemnity or contribution
under Stencel may petition Congress to compensate them for the losses
they have suffered as a result of the government's negligence. The
procedure of private bills for relief, however, places an undue burden
on both the private parties and Congress. Indeed, the FTCA was
104. Id. at 544.
105. Defendants could, of course, seek such relief only if local law permitted. See
note 36 & accompanying text supra.
106. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. §§ 11(a), 12 (1970). Congress has authorized indem-
nification provisions with respect to certain limited types of contracts: military re-
search and development contracts, 10 U.S.C. § 2354 (1970); contracts involving
nuclear risks, 50 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. V 1975); contracts involving atomic energy
facility construction or operation, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Supp. V 1975).
107. See 431 U.S. at 674 n.8.
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enacted by Congress largely in order to relieve it and the general
public of this burden.108
Conclusion
In Stencel, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its hold-
ing in Feres that "the Government is not liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise
out of or are in the course of activity incident to service."' 109  Not
since Feres itself had the Court expressed in such strong and un-
equivocal terms its support of the Feres doctrine.
The Court's decision is apparently based on the conclusion that
such indemnity claims would permit active-duty service personnel,
who are precluded by Feres from suing the government directly under
the FTCA, to accomplish the same result indirectly through a third
party claim. Such a circumvention of Feres would be contrary to
the congressional intent, recognized by the Feres Court, to preclude
active-duty service personnel from suing the government for injuries
sustained incident to service.
In articulating its decision to deny these third party claims, the
Court examined three of the same factors relied upon in Feres to
divine a congressional intent to preclude active-duty service personnel
from suing the government directly under the FTCA. As established
above, these three factors - the distinctively federal relationship be-
tween the government and military supplier, the Veterans' Benefits
Act as an upper limit on government's liability for injuries sustained
by active-duty service personnel, and the military discipline argument
-do not sufficiently support the decision to deny Stencel's claim for
indemnity.
Although Stencel clearly prohibits ordnance suppliers from seek-
ing indemnity from the Government on claims by active-duty service
personnel, the effect of the decision on the indemnity claims of other
suppliers and contractors who provide the military with such non-
military goods as food and clothing is unclear. The three factors
relied on by the Supreme Court to deny Stencel's claim become even
less persuasive when applied to these suppliers. Unlike Stencel, they
supply goods that are not distinctively military in nature. As such,
their relationship with the Armed Forces is even less "distinctively
federal in character." The Court should, therefore, narrowly limit the
decision to military ordnance suppliers and contractors.
Paul I. Dion*
108. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140; L. JAYSON, HANDLINc FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS § 52 (1977).
109. 340 U.S. at 146.
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